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 51 
DEATH IS NOT THE END: THE SECOND 
CIRCUIT ALLOWS POSTHUMOUS 
DIVISION OF PENSION BENEFITS IN YALE-
NEW HAVEN HOSPITAL v. NICHOLLS 
Abstract: On June 4, 2015, in Yale-New Haven Hospital v. Nicholls, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the Employment Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) allows state courts to posthumously 
amend qualified domestic relations orders (“QDROs”) to divide the pension plan 
benefits of a deceased plan participant. The Second Circuit joined the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in allowing QDROs to be posthumously amend-
ed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in contrast, has ruled that 
upon a plan participant’s death, benefits cannot be reassigned through the 
amendment of a QDRO. This Comment argues that the Second Circuit’s interpre-
tation of ERISA is correct. To rule otherwise would allow for externalities out-
side of a party’s control to have significantly negative consequences for substan-
tive rights. Furthermore, the allowance of posthumous QDROs is most aligned 
with the express goals of ERISA. 
INTRODUCTION 
During divorce proceedings, state courts attempt to establish equitable di-
vorce agreements through division of marital property.1 Employee pension 
plans are considered marital property in divorce proceedings.2 Because a sig-
nificant percentage of American workers participate in these plans, courts inev-
                                                                                                                           
 1 See In re Marriage of Steele, 502 N.W.2d 18, 21 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993) (noting that in divorce 
proceedings each spouse has a claim to property acquired during the marriage). See generally John R. 
Dowd, Note, Defining the Equitable Distribution in Mississippi: A Rebuttable Presumption That 
Homemaking Services Are as Valuable to the Acquisition of Marital Property as Breadwinning Ser-
vices, 16 MISS. C. L. REV. 479 (1996) (exploring the evolution of how courts in Mississippi divide 
property in divorce proceedings). 
 2 See In re Marriage of Blackstone, 630 N.E.2d 541, 544–45 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (exploring the 
development of pension plans as marital property to be divided in divorce); Barr v. Barr, 11 A.3d 875, 
883 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011) (observing that pension benefits are a marital asset that can be 
considered in effectuating fair property division in divorce proceedings if the benefits were obtained 
during marriage); Claffey v. Claffey, 822 A.2d 630, 640 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (noting that 
the pension benefits accumulated by either spouse during marriage become an element of the court’s 
equation in a fair division of marital assets); Hoyt v. Hoyt, 559 N.E.2d 1292, 1294–95 (Ohio 1990) 
(noting that generally, marital assets include retirement benefits acquired throughout the marriage and 
must be contemplated when assigning domestic relations obligations). 
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itably divide these plans as part of an equitable divorce agreement.3 When 
considering how to divide such plans in divorce agreements, state courts must 
consider both state divorce law and the requirements of the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act (“ERISA”), a federal law that provides a compre-
hensive regulatory scheme for employee pension plans.4 
In June 2015, in Yale-New Haven Hospital v. Nicholls, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit joined the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit in holding that court orders amended after the death of the plan partici-
pant retroactively comply with ERISA requirements for the division of em-
ployee retirement plans.5 The Second Circuit concluded that two amended 
nunc pro tunc orders entered by a Connecticut state court properly assigned 
benefits to the former spouse of the deceased plan participant.6 In contrast, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit had held that such amended court 
orders cannot posthumously assign plan benefits because the plan participant’s 
death eliminates any claim to the benefits.7 
This Comment argues that the Second Circuit correctly allowed for post-
humous amendment of state court orders, thereby effectively promoting the 
                                                                                                                           
 3 See Lynch v. Lynch, 665 S.W.2d 20, 23 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (noting that the lower court’s 
responsibility was to divide pension plan as part of a fair division of marital property); see also Press 
Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employee Benefits in the United States— March 2015, July 24, 
2015, http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ebs2.pdf [https://perma.cc/9BT9-2KNC] (noting that fifty-
three percent of civilian workers, forty-nine percent of private sector workers, and eighty-one percent 
of state and local government workers participate in employee pension plans). 
 4 See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 
Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 29 U.S.C.). Section 1002 defines 
“employee pension benefit plan” and “pension plan” as: 
any plan, fund, or program . . . established or maintained by an employer or by an em-
ployee organization, or by both . . . [that] provides retirement income to employees, or 
results in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending to the termination of 
employment or beyond . . . . 
29 U.S.C. § 1002 (2)(A) (2012); see also In re Gendreau, 122 F.3d 815, 817 (9th Cir. 1997) (deciding 
whether a domestic order was valid under ERISA); Hopkins v. AT&T Glob. Info. Sols. Co., 105 F.3d 
153, 154 (4th Cir. 1997) (determining if a divorce decree properly divided a pension plan per the re-
quirements of ERISA). 
 5 See Yale-New Haven Hosp. v. Nicholls (Yale-New Haven Hosp. II), 788 F.3d 79, 86, 88 (2d 
Cir. 2015) (holding that amended court orders appropriately complied with ERISA requirements and 
therefore could assign pension plan benefits to the former spouse of the deceased plan participant 
instead of his widow); Patton v. Denver Post Corp. (Patton II), 326 F.3d 1148, 1154 (10th Cir. 2003) 
(holding that a posthumously amended court order can appropriately assign plan benefits). 
 6 See Yale-New Haven Hosp. II, 788 F.3d at 81. Nunc pro tunc is a Latin expression meaning 
“now for then.” Nunc Pro Tunc, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Generally, a nunc pro 
tunc court ruling applies retroactively to correct an earlier ruling. See Snodgrass v. Snodgrass, 88 
N.E.2d 616, 618 (Ohio Ct. App. 1948) (noting that a nunc pro tunc order is used to correct a judicial 
record that does not properly reflect the intended judgment of the court). 
 7 See Samaroo v. Samaroo (Samaroo II), 193 F.3d 185, 186–87 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that a 
court order obtained after a participant’s death was not valid because benefits cannot vest after a par-
ticipant’s death). 
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aims of ERISA.8 This Comment also argues that a minor amendment to 
ERISA would adequately address the concerns of the Third Circuit that post-
humous amendments of state court orders are an impermissible division of 
pension benefits.9 Part I of this Comment discusses the factual and procedural 
history of Yale-New Haven Hospital and reviews the legislative history of 
ERISA.10 Part II explains the split between the Second, Third, and Tenth Cir-
cuits in determining whether ERISA authorizes posthumous court orders to be 
applied retroactively.11 Finally, Part III argues that the Tenth and Second Cir-
cuits correctly interpreted Congress’s intent by holding that ERISA allows for 
retroactive application of posthumous court orders.12 
I. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF ERISA AND YALE-NEW HAVEN HOSPITAL 
Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act in 1974 
to protect employees participating in employee pension plans.13 By establish-
ing a uniform national regulatory scheme for such plans, Congress hoped to 
encourage employers to partake in employer-funded pension plans through 
efficient and consistent regulation.14 This uniform regulatory scheme, however, 
has not been without issues: courts have struggled to apply the anti-alienation 
provision of ERISA to divorce agreements containing pension plans.15 Section 
                                                                                                                           
 8 See infra notes 84–94 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra notes 95–103 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 13–55 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 56–83 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 84–103 and accompanying text. 
 13 See 29 U.S.C. § 1001b (2012) (providing Congressional findings that the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act’s changes to the pension system would boost the probability of employees re-
ceiving benefits upon retirement). Momentum for the creation and subsequent passage of ERISA is 
often associated with the shutdown of the Studebaker-Packard facility in Indiana in 1963, which left 
many workers without their expected pensions due to a grossly underfunded plan. See JAMES A. 
WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: A POLITICAL HISTORY 51 
(2001). ERISA was passed to protect employees’ interests in pension plans and to ensure proper pay-
outs on retirement. See id. at 1. 
 14 See Donald T. Bogan, ERISA: The Savings Clause, § 502 Implied Preemption, Complete 
Preemption, and State Law Remedies, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 105, 117–18 (2001) (noting that 
Congress chose the language of ERISA specifically to encourage the use of ERISA-covered retire-
ment plans by providing employers with a consistent regulatory scheme rather than varying state regu-
lations); Katherine A. McAllister, Note, A Distinction Without a Difference? ERISA Preemption and 
the Untenable Differential Treatment of Revocation-on-Divorce and Slayer Statutes, 52 B.C. L. REV. 
1481, 1484 (2011) (describing Congress’s motivation in passage of comprehensive and uniform regu-
lation). 
 15 See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (2012). ERISA requires that benefits in a pension plan cannot be 
“assigned or alienated.” Id. When dividing pension plans in divorce agreements, courts were conflict-
ed about whether divorce-related property divisions violated the anti-alienation clause of ERISA. 
Compare Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118, 121 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that there was an 
implied exception to ERISA’s anti-alienation language for family support payments), with Monsanto 
Co. v. Ford, 534 F. Supp. 51, 54 (E.D. Mo. 1981) (holding that distributing benefits from a pension 
plan to a former spouse violated ERISA’s anti-alienation clause). 
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A of this Part examines the development of ERISA and its effect on the divi-
sion of pension plans as marital property in divorce agreements.16 Section B of 
this Part details Yale-New Haven Hospital v. Nicholls, a case in which the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit interpreted ERISA’s anti-alienation 
clause.17 
A. History of ERISA’s Anti-Alienation Clause 
In order to secure the financial future of employees, a primary goal of 
ERISA, Congress included in ERISA an anti-alienation provision that mandat-
ed that pension benefits could not be “assigned or alienated.”18 This provision 
protected employees by ensuring that the funds paid into the pension plans 
could not be assigned to a creditor and therefore be unavailable upon retire-
ment.19 Following ERISA’s enactment, courts were unsure whether ERISA’s 
anti-alienation clause allowed pension plans to be divided in divorce proceed-
ings.20 ERISA’s anti-alienation clause explicitly prohibits alienation or assign-
ment of pension benefits, but there was no guidance for state courts as to 
whether that prohibition applied in divorce proceedings, which require an equi-
table division of marital property.21 
The confused status of pension benefits in divorce agreements ultimately 
led to the adoption of the Retirement Equity Act of 1984 (“REA”), which es-
tablished a narrow exception to ERISA’s anti-alienation clause: the qualified 
domestic relations order (“QDRO”).22 A state court domestic relations order is 
                                                                                                                           
 16 See infra notes 18–32 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 33–55 and accompanying text. 
 18 See 29 U.S.C. § 1001b (providing Congressional findings that the passage of ERISA would 
increase the likelihood of plan participants and their beneficiaries receiving a full payout of their bene-
fits); see also id. § 1056(d)(1) (noting that the benefits of pension plans covered under ERISA cannot 
be “assigned or alienated”). 
 19 See Robert S. Melson, Are Your Pension Benefits Safe from Creditors?, BENEFITSLINK.COM 
(1995), http://benefitslink.com/articles/creditors.html [https://perma.cc/Z428-GVE4] (discussing how 
the anti-alienation clause ensures that pension benefits do not get assigned to another party, especially 
creditors, even in bankruptcy). 
 20 Compare Carpenters Pension Tr. v. Kronschnabel, 460 F. Supp. 978, 982 (C.D. Cal. 1978) 
(holding that pension division between divorcing spouses recognizes a preexisting property right, an 
implicit joint ownership rather than an alienation or assignment forbidden by ERISA), with Francis v. 
United Techs. Corp., 458 F. Supp. 84, 86 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (noting that garnishment for family support 
obligations is irreconcilable with ERISA’s anti-alienation clause). 
 21 See DAVID CLAYTON CARRAD, THE COMPLETE QDRO HANDBOOK: DIVIDING ERISA, MILI-
TARY, AND CIVIL SERVICE PENSION AND COLLECTING CHILD SUPPORT FROM EMPLOYEE BENEFIT 
PLANS 3 (3d ed. 2009). Carrad notes that ERISA’s anti-alienation clause was at tension with domestic 
relations law as it related to pension divisibility. Id. States have a strong interest in retaining control of 
the distribution of pension benefits in divorce because the division of assets upon divorce is linked to 
support obligations. See Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 848 (1997) (explaining that Congress proba-
bly did not intend to disturb states’ rights to adjudicate domestic support obligations). 
 22 See Retirement Equity Act of 1984 (“REA”), Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (1984) 
(amending various provisions of 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1401); cf. Julie McDaniel Dallison, Comment, 
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a judgment or order that conveys domestic relations rights in accordance with 
state law.23 To be classified as a QDRO, a domestic relations order must meet 
specific requirements enumerated in the REA.24 QDROs act as an instrument 
for a divorced spouse to receive distribution of pension benefits as marital 
property upon divorce.25  
Obtaining a QDRO can be an extensive process, sometimes complicated 
by the death of the plan participant.26 To accommodate this, ERISA provides 
for an eighteen-month determination period during which the administrator 
must determine whether a domestic relations order satisfies the strict require-
ments to be a valid QDRO.27 For a domestic relations order to retroactively 
                                                                                                                           
Disappearing Interests: ERISA Impliedly Preempts the Predeceasing Nonemployee Spouse’s Commu-
nity Property Interest in the Employee’s Retirement, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 477, 483 (1997) (stating that 
the REA was passed as a solution to state courts’ problem of how to divide a pension plan to reflect a 
nonemployee spouse’s marital interest in the pension plan). 
 23 See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i)–(ii) (2012) (defining a qualified domestic relations order). 
Some examples of domestic relations rights are child support and alimony. See id. 
 24 Id. The statute defines a domestic relations order as: 
any judgment, decree, or order (including approval of a property settlement agreement) 
which—(I) relates to the provision of child support, alimony payments, or marital property 
rights to a spouse, former spouse, child, or other dependent of a participant, and (II) is 
made pursuant to a State domestic relations law (including community property law). 
Id. A qualified domestic relations order (“QDRO”) is a “domestic relations order—(I) which creates 
or recognizes the existence of an alternate payee’s right to, or assigns to an alternate payee the right to, 
receive all or a portion of the benefits payable with respect to a participant under a plan . . . .” Id. In 
order to qualify as a QDRO, an order must specify: 
(i) the name and the last known mailing address (if any) of the participant and the name 
and mailing address of each alternate payee covered by the order, (ii) the amount or 
percentage of the participant’s benefits to be paid by the plan to each such alternate 
payee, or the manner in which such amount or percentage is to be determined, (iii) the 
number of payments or period to which such order applies, and (iv) each plan to which 
such order applies. 
Id. § 1056(d)(3)(C). 
 25 See Dallison, supra note 22, at 484 (noting that a party who is not the plan participant can only 
receive a payout from a plan administrator if that party has a QDRO). 
 26 See In re Gendreau, 122 F.3d at 819 (noting that Congress recognizes that the process for ob-
taining a QDRO is time intensive); see also Gary Shulman, QDROs: The Ticking Time Bomb, 23 
FAM. ADVOC. 26, 26 (2000–01) (noting that “[m]ost family law attorneys are aware of the potential 
adverse consequences of a participant’s dying before the QDRO is drafted,” and warning that former 
spouses often do not receive pension benefits they are entitled to pursuant to a separation agreement 
because he or she did not receive a valid QDRO prior to the plan participant’s death). 
 27 See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(G)(II), (H)(i)–(v). These ERISA provisions direct the plan adminis-
trator to determine, within a reasonable period of time after a domestic relations order is submitted for 
qualification, whether the order meets the requirements for a QDRO. See id. During this period, a 
pension plan must set aside the benefits that are potentially payable to the holder of the unclassified 
domestic relations order. See id. § 1056(d)(3)(H)(i); see also Trs. of the Dirs. Guild of Am. v. Tise, 
234 F.3d 415, 422 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that Congress intended the determination period to allow 
former spouses to remedy any errors in the original domestic relations order that would not allow the 
order to be classified as valid QDRO). 
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provide benefits, a determination that the order satisfies the QDRO require-
ments must be made within the eighteen-month determination period.28 Any 
determination made after the eighteen-month period only applies prospective-
ly.29 
By incorporating the REA, ERISA provides former spouses with a mech-
anism to claim a portion of a pension plan participant’s benefits without run-
ning afoul of the anti-alienation clause.30 Despite resolving the issue of wheth-
er pension benefits can be distributed as marital property upon divorce, courts 
remain divided on when a former spouse of a deceased plan participant may 
obtain a QDRO that impacts the division of that property.31 The Second Cir-
cuit confronted this issue in Yale-New Haven Hospital when it was asked by a 
plan administrator to resolve competing claims for plan benefits brought by 
both the widow and the former spouse of a deceased plan participant.32 
B. The Second Circuit Addresses Posthumous QDROs in  
Yale-New Haven Hospital v. Nicholls 
On September 5, 2008, Harold Nicholls and Claire Nicholls were di-
vorced in Connecticut state court and granted a dissolution of marriage judg-
ment.33 Mr. Nicholls married Barbara Nicholls in 2009 and died in February 
2012.34 At the time of his death, Mr. Nicholls was an employee of Yale-New 
Haven Hospital and a participant in four employee retirement and pension 
                                                                                                                           
 28 See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(H)(i)–(v) (detailing the procedures of the eighteen-month determi-
nation period, including a requirement that the plan administrator must adhere to accounting require-
ments during the determination period as articulated by ERISA). 
 29 See id. § 1056(d)(3)(H)(iv) (explaining when a QDRO can offer prospective or retroactive 
relief). 
 30 See id. § 1056(d)(3) (enumerating the requirements for a domestic relations order to be consid-
ered a QDRO); David J. Guin, The Retirement Equity Act of 1984: One Step Forward, Two Steps 
Back, 37 ALA. L. REV. 163, 163 (1985) (exploring Congress’s intent in the passage of the Retirement 
Equity Act (“REA”)); see also CARRAD, supra note 21, at 4 (noting that the REA states the proce-
dures that pension plans covered under ERISA must follow in order to decide if a court order qualifies 
as a QDRO). 
 31 See Steven P. Smith, Traps of the Unwary: Avoiding Problems with Employee Benefit Plans in 
Divorce, J. KAN. BAR ASS’N, Feb. 2011, at 24, 25 (exploring potential problems divorce attorneys 
face when obtaining QDROs during divorce proceedings). Compare Patton II, 326 F.3d at 1154 
(holding that a QDRO can be obtained after the death of a plan participant), with Samaroo II, 193 F.3d 
at 190 (holding that the death of a plan participant is a cutoff for a former spouse to obtain a QDRO). 
 32 See Yale-New Haven Hosp. II, 788 F.3d at 81. The plan administrator filed an interpleader 
claim. See id. An interpleader claim occurs when two parties claim a right to the same thing, and a 
third party, here the plan administrator, files a lawsuit in order to force the parties to litigate their title 
between themselves. See Interpleader, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
 33 Yale-New Haven Hosp. v. Nicholls (Yale-New Haven Hosp. I), No. 3:12-CV-01319, 2013 WL 
6331256, at *1 (D. Conn. Dec. 5, 2013), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 788 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2015). As 
part of the divorce, a settlement agreement awarded Claire Nicholls half of Harold Nicholls’s retire-
ment accounts. Id. 
 34 Yale-New Haven Hosp. II, 788 F.3d at 83. 
2016] Second Circuit Allows Posthumous Division of Pension Benefits 57 
plans managed by the hospital.35 Though Barbara Nicholls was the beneficiary 
of all four plans, the plans were included in the dissolution of marriage judg-
ment between Mr. Nicholls and Claire Nicholls.36 Additionally, Claire Nicholls 
asserted that Mr. Nicholls was uncooperative in helping her to obtain a valid 
QDRO prior to his death.37 
In June and August 2012, two nunc pro tunc orders from the Connecticut 
Superior Court directed Yale-New Haven Hospital, the plan administrator of 
Mr. Nicholls’s retirement and pension plans, to distribute the benefits in three 
of Mr. Nicholls’s plans to Claire Nicholls.38 Subsequently, Yale-New Haven 
Hospital received competing claims from Barbara Nicholls for the three re-
tirement and pension plans specified in the nunc pro tunc orders as well as a 
claim for the fourth plan that was not included in the nunc pro tunc orders.39 
Yale-New Haven Hospital then filed an interpleader action as plan administra-
tor in federal district court to resolve the competing claims.40 The role of a plan 
administrator is to manage the plan and to follow the terms of the plan.41 The 
district court granted summary judgment in favor of Claire Nicholls, holding 
that the dissolution of marriage judgment entered in 2008 “substantially com-
plied” with ERISA’s requirements for QDROs.42 
                                                                                                                           
 35 Id. Mr. Nicholls participated in the following plans: 
(1) the Yale-New Haven Hospital Cash Account Pension Plan (“CAP Plan”), (2) the 
Yale-New Haven Hospital Matching Tax Shelter Annuity Plan (“Matching Plan”), (3) 
the Yale-New Haven Hospital Section 403(b) Tax-Sheltered Annuity Plan (“403(b) 
Plan”), and (4) the Yale-New Haven Hospital and Tax-Exempt Affiliates 457 Non-
Qualified Deferred Compensation Plan (“457 Plan”). 
Id. 
 36 See id. at 81. 
 37 See id. at 89 (Wesley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 38 Id. at 83 (majority opinion). The nunc pro tunc orders mentioned (1) the CAP Plan, (2) the 
Matching Plan, and (3) the 403(b) Plan. Id. Neither order mentioned the fourth plan, the 457 Plan. See 
id. The nunc pro tunc orders explicitly stated that they were intended to be QDROs as defined by 
ERISA. See id. The amount in dispute from the retirement plans totaled $351,392.52. See Yale-New 
Haven Hosp. I, 2013 WL 6331256, at *1. 
 39 See Yale-New Haven Hosp. I, 2013 WL 6331256, at *1. 
 40 See Yale-New Haven Hosp. II, 788 F.3d at 83. 
 41 Cigna v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421, 422 (2011) (noting that the plan administrator acts as a “trustee-
like fiduciary” in managing the plan and following the terms of the plan); see 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(A) 
(defining an administrator as “the person specifically so designated by the terms of the instrument under 
which the plan is operated”). 
 42 See Yale-New Haven Hosp. I, 2013 WL 6331256, at *3. The district court relied on reasoning 
from the Second Circuit’s 2002 decision in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Bigelow that an order 
that “substantially complies” with ERISA requirements is a valid QDRO. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Bigelow, 283 F.3d 436, 444 (2d Cir. 2002); Yale-New Haven Hosp., 2013 WL 6331256, at *3. In the 
Bigelow court’s view, a plan administrator must accept such an order or otherwise abuse their discre-
tionary authority. See Bigelow, 283 F.3d at 444; Yale-New Haven Hosp. I, 2013 WL 6331256, at *3. 
ERISA explicitly states that “property settlement agreements” are domestic relations orders, and 
Claire Nicholls and Mr. Nicholls’s divorce agreement included division of the retirement plans, which 
is marital property. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii) (2012) (defining what constitutes a domestic 
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On appeal, the Second Circuit reviewed the “substantial compliance” 
standard used by the district court and considered whether the nunc pro tunc 
orders constituted valid QDROs.43 The Second Circuit reversed the district 
court’s finding that the dissolution of marriage judgment constituted a QDRO 
and rejected the “substantial compliance” standard as applied in this case.44 
The court, however, held that Claire Nicholls had valid QDROs under 
ERISA.45 The court concluded that the nunc pro tunc orders issued by the 
Connecticut state court were valid QDROs despite being entered after the 
death of Mr. Nicholls.46 According to the Second Circuit, Congress, in passing 
the Pension Protection Act, clearly intended posthumous QDROs to be a valid 
method for former spouses to receive benefits to which they are entitled.47 
Additionally, the Second Circuit reasoned that in cases in which a domes-
tic relations order has been entered giving pension or retirement benefits to 
someone other than the surviving spouse, the plan administrator must establish 
the status of the domestic relations order as a valid or invalid QDRO before 
rights to the plan benefits can be granted.48 Until the domestic relations order 
                                                                                                                           
relations order); Yale-New Haven Hosp. I, 2013 WL 6331256, at *3. The orders, therefore, substan-
tially complied with the QDRO requirements under ERISA. See id. 
 43 See Yale-New Haven Hosp. II, 788 F.3d at 84 (holding that the “substantial compliance” stand-
ard was not appropriate given the passage of the REA, but holding that the court orders were valid 
QDROs despite their posthumous nature). Barbara Nicholls raised two arguments on appeal: (1) 
Claire Nicholls and Mr. Nicholls’s divorce agreement did not meet the enumerated requirements for a 
QDRO under ERISA, and (2) the nunc pro tunc orders could not be valid QDROs due to the posthu-
mous timing of their acquisition. Id. 
 44 See id. The “substantial compliance” standard cannot apply to orders obtained after the date the 
REA was enacted. See id. at 85. Therefore, the Nicholls’s settlement agreement could only be consid-
ered a QDRO if it met the requirements of a QDRO as specified in the REA, which it did not. See id. 
(holding that the “substantial compliance” rule used in Bigelow was only appropriate in that case be-
cause the divorce agreement between those parties was entered prior to the passage of the REA). 
 45 See Yale-New Haven Hosp. II, 788 F.3d at 85. 
 46 See id. The nunc pro tunc orders were only valid QDROs as to the CAP Plan, the Matching 
Plan, and the 403(b) Plan. Id. Because the 457 Plan was not named in either nunc pro tunc order, 
Claire Nicholls did not have a QDRO for that plan, and the court reversed the district court’s determi-
nation relating solely to that plan. See id. 
 47 See id. at 86; see also Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 1001, 120 Stat. 
780, 1052–53 (2006). Similar to the passage of ERISA, Congress passed the Pension Protection Act to 
protect the stability of pension plans while also decreasing the number of underfunded pension funds. 
See Robert S. Keebler, Pension Protection Act of 2006, 9 J. RETIREMENT PLAN. 39, 39 (2006). Addi-
tionally, a portion of the Pension Protection Act asserted that the timing of when a QDRO is obtained 
cannot act as the sole reason for its disallowance. See Yale-New Haven Hosp. II, 788 F.3d at 86 (quot-
ing § 1001, 120 Stat. at 1053). 
 48 See Yale-New Haven Hosp. II, 788 F.3d at 87. ERISA does not allow for automatic vesting in 
the surviving spouse when it is unclear whether a domestic relations order giving benefits to another 
person, such as a former spouse, is a QDRO. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(H) (2012) (describing the 
procedure that plan administrators must undergo when determining whether a domestic relations order 
is a QDRO); Hillary Greer Fike, QDROs: The High Price of Poor Drafting—Part II, COLO. LAW., 
Sept. 1999, at 89 (explaining how the eighteen-month determination period affects a lawyer’s drafting 
of a QDRO). During the course of an eighteen-month determination period, the plan administrator 
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is found to be a QDRO, a valid alternate payee can overtake a surviving 
spouse’s interest in the plan benefits.49 Consequently, the Second Circuit con-
cluded that Barbara Nicholls’s rights to the plan benefits did not fully mature 
when Mr. Nicholls died, despite the fact that she was a surviving spouse.50 Ac-
cordingly, the court held that a QDRO could be retroactively applied even 
when acquired posthumously.51 
In dissent, Judge Wesley argued that the majority erred in holding that the 
two state court nunc pro tunc orders were valid QDROs.52 The dissent argued 
that the orders could not be valid QDROs because they were entered posthu-
mously.53 In the dissent’s view, posthumous QDROs require a reassignment of 
benefits that is not sanctioned by law.54 In addition, Judge Wesley argued that 
to retroactively apply the nunc pro tunc orders permits a state court to bypass 
ERISA’s statutory scheme concerning the alienation of pension benefits.55 
II. CIRCUITS STRUGGLE WITH INTERPRETING CONGRESS’S INTENT IN THE 
RETIREMENT EQUITY ACT OF 1984 
Since the enactment of the Retirement Equity Act in 1984, courts have 
struggled with the question of whether the REA, as incorporated in ERISA, 
authorizes the use of posthumous QDROs to assign benefits to former spous-
es.56 Yale New Haven Hospital v. Nicholls, a 2015 decision by the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, is the most recent attempt by courts to an-
                                                                                                                           
must separate the benefits that will be paid if the domestic relations order is validated as a QDRO. See 
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(H). 
 49 See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(H). 
 50 See Yale-New Haven Hosp. II, 788 F.3d at 88 (noting that a surviving spouse’s interest in plan 
benefits cannot fully mature until a plan administrator clarifies the validity of a domestic relations 
order); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(H)(i) (describing the accounting procedures that a plan admin-
istrator must follow until the status of the domestic relations order has been determined). 
 51 See Yale-New Haven Hosp. II, 788 F.3d at 88. 
 52 See id. at 89, 93 (Wesley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that benefits 
vest automatically in a surviving spouse and QDROs cannot re-vest those same benefits in a former 
spouse). 
 53 See id. at 92–93. Judge Wesley adopted the view that a surviving spouse’s interest in plan ben-
efits completely matures at a plan participant’s time of death and therefore the benefits cannot be 
given to a former spouse due to ERISA’s anti-alienation provisions. See id. at 93 (arguing that plan 
benefits do not belong to the estate of a plan participant but must be given to a surviving spouse at the 
time of a plan participant’s death); see also § 1056(d)(3)(A) (noting that the anti-alienation clause 
does not apply to a QDRO). 
 54 See Yale-New Haven Hosp. II, 788 F.3d at 90 (arguing that posthumous QDROs that result in 
benefits that have already vested being reassigned is explicitly disallowed by ERISA). 
 55 See id. at 92 (arguing that allowing the nunc pro tunc orders to be effective at a date prior to the 
order being entered would illegally avoid the requirements implemented by ERISA). 
 56 Compare Hogan v. Raytheon, Co., 302 F.3d 854, 857 (8th Cir. 2002) (noting that plan partici-
pant’s death prior to court entering a domestic relations order does not automatically disqualify order 
from being QDRO), with Ross v. Ross, 705 A.2d 784, 797 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (holding 
that QDRO could not be entered after the death of plan participant). 
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swer this question.57 Prior to the Second Circuit’s decision in Yale New Haven 
Hospital, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Third and Tenth Circuits heard 
cases analyzing the validity of posthumous QDROs and reached different con-
clusions.58 Section A of this Part examines the Third Circuit’s 1999 decision in 
Samaroo v. Samaroo, which disallowed the assignment of pension benefits to 
former spouses through posthumous QDROs.59 Section B details the Tenth 
Circuit’s 2003 decision in Patton v. Denver Post, which held that the REA, as 
incorporated in ERISA, allows for the use of posthumous QDROs.60 
A. Third Circuit: Posthumous QDROs Are Invalid 
In 1999, in Samaroo v. Samaroo, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit held that posthumous QDROs are invalid under ERISA.61 The case 
concerned former spouses who divorced in 1984.62 Their divorce decree grant-
ed the former spouse an interest in her ex-husband’s pension benefits.63 The 
divorce decree, however, did not explicitly include the pre-retirement survival 
annuity that the pension plan provided for a surviving spouse in the event of 
the plan participant’s death prior to retirement.64 The ex-husband died two 
years before retirement, which is when his benefit payments were scheduled to 
automatically begin, but because the plan participant did not reach retirement 
age prior to his death, the plan administrator was not obligated to pay the bene-
fits from the plan.65 Subsequently, his former spouse received an amended di-
                                                                                                                           
 57 See Yale-New Haven Hosp. v. Nicholls (Yale-New Haven Hosp. II), 788 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir. 
2015). 
 58 See Patton v. Denver Post Co. (Patton II), 326 F.3d 1148, 1154 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that a 
QDRO can be obtained after the death of a plan participant); Samaroo v. Samaroo (Samaroo II), 193 
F.3d 185, 190 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that the death of a plan participant is a cutoff for obtaining a 
QDRO for a former spouse). 
 59 See infra notes 61–73 and accompanying text. 
 60 See infra notes 74–83 and accompanying text. 
 61 See Samaroo II, 193 F.3d at 191 (holding that allowing posthumous QDROs amounts to an 
increase in a pension plan’s payment obligations, which is illegal under ERISA); Bruce L. Richman, 
Tax Trips & Traps: Dividing Retirement Benefits, FAM. ADVOC., Fall 2001, at 36, 36 (demonstrating 
the need to draft a QDRO at the time of divorce settlement in order to ensure it will be honored by a 
plan administrator); Smith v. Estate of Smith, 248 F. Supp. 2d 348, 354–55 (D.N.J. 2003) (noting that 
a domestic relations order can only be a QDRO if it does not result in increased liability for the plan). 
 62 See Samaroo v. Samaroo (Samaroo I), 743 F. Supp. 309, 311 (D.N.J. 1999). 
 63 See id. at 311. A mutually agreed-upon property settlement within the divorce decree divided 
the ex-husband’s monthly retirement pension benefits evenly between the two former spouses. See 
Samaroo II, 193 F.3d at 187. 
 64 See Samaroo II, 193 F.3d at 187. 
 65 See id. Because Mr. Samaroo did not reach the requisite age to qualify to receive pension pay-
ments for the plan in the settlement agreement, the plan never became payable. See id. Accordingly, in 
the court’s view, because the plan never became payable, the settlement agreement did not contain 
any benefits payable to his former spouse. See id. 
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vorce decree that awarded her the survival annuity that had not been named in 
the original divorce decree.66 
On appeal, the Third Circuit reasoned that the amended divorce decree is-
sued by the state did not constitute a valid QDRO because it was issued after 
the death of the plan participant.67 According to the court, pension benefits 
must be calculated as of the date that the benefits become payable and cannot 
be reassigned after this determination.68 In the court’s view, QDROs—
including those entered posthumously—cannot increase benefits to be paid out 
of a plan beyond what the plan anticipated based on actuarial calculations.69 
The court held that QDROs that do increase benefits to be paid in excess of 
what the plan anticipated are therefore invalid and unenforceable.70 
Dissenting, Judge Mansmann rejected the majority’s reasoning and con-
clusion.71 Judge Mansmann asserted that to disallow posthumous QDROs 
jeopardized states’ ability to govern their own domestic relations law, specifi-
cally the division of pensions as marital assets.72 Judge Mansmann’s dissent 
served as the foundation for the majority’s opinion in Patton v. Denver Post.73 
                                                                                                                           
 66 See id. at 188. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the plan administrator, 
asserting that the amended divorce decree could not be a valid QDRO. See id. 
 67 See Samaroo II, 193 F.3d at 191. The court noted that when a plan participant does not either 
remarry or provide an alternate payee to a survivor’s annuity, after the plan participant’s death the 
rights to the survivor’s annuity essentially do not exist and therefore cannot be assigned using a post-
humous QDRO. See id. 
 68 See id. at 189–90. 
 69 See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(D) (2012); Samaroo II, 193 F.3d at 189–90. The district court 
reached the conclusion that the former spouse attempted, through the amended divorce decree, to 
receive plan benefits beyond those she was entitled to at the initial date of determination, which in the 
court’s view was not legal under ERISA. See Samaroo II, 193 F.3d at 189. The Samaroo court af-
firmed the district court’s reasoning and condemned the validity of the amended order as a QDRO. Id. 
at 191. 
 70 See Samaroo II, 193 F.3d at 189–90 (noting that any domestic court order that increases the 
amount of money that a plan owes cannot be a QDRO no matter the language and proposed power of 
the order under state law). 
 71 See id. at 192–93 (Mansmann, J., dissenting) (arguing that allowing state courts to amend di-
vorce decrees retroactively is in line with the separation of powers between state and federal courts 
and allows fair pension benefit distribution in general by protecting state law interests). 
 72 See id. at 193–94 (arguing that federal law should not allow courts to completely oppose the 
explicit function of state nunc pro tunc orders). Judge Mansmann asserted that the “evident purpose” 
of the REA’s QDRO provisions is to “avoid undue interference” with the resolution of a crucial area 
of domestic relations law. See id. He asserted that any timeline not contemplated by ERISA interferes 
with state courts’ ability to divide marital assets justly. Id.; see Brandon Carney, Comment, Till Death 
Do Us Part—And Then Some: The Effect of a Party’s Death During Dissolution, 25 J. AM. ACAD. 
MATRIM. LAW. 153, 176 (2012) (noting that obtaining a QDRO after the divorce is final places parties 
at risk of a potentially unavailable nunc pro tunc order); see also Patton II, 326 F.3d at 1153 (holding 
that nunc pro tunc orders can be QDROs because nunc pro tunc orders function to address minor 
errors of the court and do not fundamentally change the facts of a case). 
 73 See Patton II, 326 F.3d at 1153. 
62 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 57:E. Supp. 
B. Tenth Circuit: Posthumous QDROs Are Valid 
In 2003, in Patton v. Denver Post, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit ruled that posthumous QDROs are a valid method to secure pension plan 
benefits so long as the QDRO fits within the requirements of ERISA.74 In Pat-
ton, a former spouse received a portion of her ex-husband’s pension benefits 
through a divorce decree.75 After her ex-husband’s death, the former spouse 
learned of an undisclosed pension plan and petitioned the state court to divide 
the undisclosed plan in the same way as the previously divided plan.76 The 
state court issued a nunc pro tunc domestic relations order for the undisclosed 
plan.77 When the former spouse submitted the order to the plan administrator, 
the plan administrator refused to recognize her as a beneficiary of her ex-
husband’s plan.78 The administrator argued that because the ex-husband’s pen-
sion benefits had lapsed when he died, the former spouse’s court order could 
not be a QDRO.79 
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit rejected the pension plan’s position that 
ERISA requires a beneficiary of a pension plan to file a QDRO prior to the 
plan participant’s death.80 The Patton court interpreted ERISA’s eighteen-
month determination period provision in § 1056(d) to indicate that ERISA an-
ticipates and accounts for the possibility of posthumous QDROs.81 Conse-
quently, the court encouraged state courts to widely administer retroactive re-
                                                                                                                           
 74 See Patton II, 326 F.3d at 1152–54; see also Shulman, supra note 26, at 26 (exploring drafting 
of QDROs in the period after the Third Circuit’s decision in Samaroo II). Compare Patton II, 326 
F.3d at 1151 (holding that QDROs attained posthumously are valid under ERISA), with Samaroo II, 
193 F.3d at 186 (finding that posthumous QDROs are not valid under ERISA and cannot assign bene-
fits to former spouses). 
 75 See Patton v. Denver Post Co. (Patton I), 179 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1233–34 (D. Colo. 2002), 
aff’d, 326 F.3d 1148 (10th Cir. 2003) (detailing the separation agreement between the former spouses 
and the circumstances that resulted in the unintentional nondisclosure). 
 76 See id. at 1233–34. Both parties supplied financial information while negotiating the divorce 
agreement. See Patton II, 326 F.3d at 1150. When the ex-husband asked his employer about his pen-
sion benefits his employer only revealed information about a single pension plan, even though the ex-
husband was a plan participant in two plans. See id. One plan was inadvertently omitted. See id. 
 77 See Patton I, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 1234. 
 78 See Patton II, 326 F.3d at 1150. 
 79 See id. at 1153. The plan administrator’s argument was an extension of the majority’s decision 
in Samaroo. See id. at 1153; see also Samaroo II, 193 F.3d at 186. 
 80 See Patton II, 326 F.3d at 1151–52. In rejecting the pension plan’s argument that ERISA re-
quires establishment of the right to pension benefits with a QDRO prior to the death of the participant, 
the court explained that this is not an explicit requirement in the statute. See id.; see also Hogan, 302 
F.3d at 857 (holding that a domestic relations order can posthumously be ruled a QDRO); Albert Feu-
er, Who Is Entitled to Survivor Benefits from ERISA Plans?, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 919, 990–91 
(exploring how the death of a plan participant affects survivor benefits and the attainability of 
QDROs). 
 81 See Patton II, 326 F.3d at 1152–53. 
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lief in the area of domestic relations.82 In 2015, in Yale-New Haven Hospital, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit joined the Tenth Circuit, 
holding that posthumous QDROs are valid under ERISA and can be used to 
assign benefits to former spouses as part of a divorce agreement.83 
III. POSTHUMOUS QDROS ARE ESSENTIAL TO DIVISION OF DIVORCE 
ASSETS AND THE NEXT STEP FOR ERISA 
The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second and Tenth Circuits correctly 
held that posthumous QDROs are valid under ERISA.84 First, this Part argues 
that the Second Circuit’s 2015 holding in Yale-New Haven Hospital v. Nicholls 
is in line with Congress’s intent in the passage of ERISA and subsequent pas-
sage of the REA.85 Next, this Part argues that invalidation of posthumous 
QDROs is inherently flawed because to do so significantly perverts the power 
of state courts to render equitable division of assets upon divorce.86 Finally, 
this Part argues that Congress should further amend ERISA to provide for a 
firm and unambiguous deadline on the submission and enforcement of post-
humous QDROs.87 
First, the Second Circuit’s ruling in Yale-New Haven Hospital allowing 
for posthumous QDROs aligns closely with the REA’s goal of equitable re-
tirement plan distribution upon divorce.88 Allowing the untimely death of a 
plan participant to effectively circumvent a divorce agreement would make this 
goal unattainable.89 Accordingly, the Second Circuit correctly held that post-
                                                                                                                           
 82 See id. at 1154 (“If necessary changes once effected by the state court are not then recognized 
by plan administrators or by federal courts adjudicating disputes, state courts are effectively stripped 
of their ability to equitably distribute marital assets in a divorce.”). 
 83 See Yale-New Haven Hosp. II, 788 F.3d at 85. 
 84 See Yale-New Haven Hosp. v. Nicholls (Yale-New Haven Hosp. II), 788 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir. 
2015); Patton v. Denver Post Co. (Patton II), 326 F.3d 1148, 1154 (10th Cir. 2003); see also Nathan 
Ross, A Power Struggle of Mythic Proportion: In the World of ERISA, Are Retirement Plan Adminis-
trators the Real Gods of Olympus?, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 529, 553 (2012) (noting that language of 
ERISA supports allowance of posthumous QDROs and that courts are likely to depart from the Sama-
roo II decision); Shulman, supra note 26, at 28 (criticizing the Third Circuit’s unwillingness to permit 
changes to a QDRO after the death of a participant in Samaroo II). 
 85 See infra notes 88–90 and accompanying text. 
 86 See infra notes 91–94 and accompanying text. 
 87 See infra notes 95–103 and accompanying text. 
 88 See Yale-New Haven Hosp. II, 788 F.3d at 85 (holding that nunc pro tunc orders are QDROs 
irrespective of whether they are obtained posthumously); see also Ablamis v. Roper, 937 F.2d 1450, 
1453 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that, when pension benefits are a marital asset, Congress intended the 
REA to protect ex-wives and their financial security); Stahl v. Exxon Corp., 212 F. Supp. 2d 657, 667 
(S.D. Tex. 2002) (noting that Congress strengthened protections for divorced spouses through passage 
of the REA by safeguarding their interests in pension benefits earned during marriage); S. REP. NO. 
98-575, at 12 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2547, 2558 (examining the policy behind the 
amendment of ERISA through the passage of the REA). 
 89 Compare Patton II, 326 F.3d at 1151 (demonstrating an instance in which the plan participant’s 
untimely death did not result in the former spouse losing benefits to which she was entitled), with 
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humous QDROs are valid, ultimately avoiding the unfair distribution of mari-
tal assets and most effectively effectuating the goals of the REA, as incorpo-
rated in ERISA.90 
Second, the Second Circuit was correct to allow posthumous QDROs be-
cause to disallow them perverts the power of state courts to render equitable 
division of assets upon divorce.91 State courts are best situated to determine 
equitable pension distribution in divorce agreements.92 Allowing states to issue 
posthumous QDROs places legal decisions related to domestic relations in the 
jurisdiction most skilled to handle such issues.93 Additionally, if allowed to 
issue posthumous QDROs, state courts will be empowered to protect the for-
mer spouse’s interest in pension benefits—a goal of the REA.94 
Allowing for posthumous QDROs best aligns with the express purposes 
of ERISA and the REA.95 ERISA, however, should be further amended to in-
clude a firm timeline in which posthumous QDROs will be considered for re-
lief.96 If the REA forces plan administrators to consider all posthumous 
                                                                                                                           
Samaroo v. Samaroo (Samaroo II), 193 F.3d 185, 186 (3d Cir. 1999) (demonstrating a former 
spouse’s loss of agreed-upon benefits solely because of the untimely death of a plan participant). 
 90 See Yale-New Haven Hosp. II, 788 F.3d at 83; see also Ross, supra note 84, at 555 (arguing 
that Congress should overrule Samaroo II and other cases in line with its holding by clarifying that 
eighteen-month determination period can be used for securing a QDRO); Shulman, supra note 26, at 
28 (asserting that dissent in Samaroo II is correct way to view posthumous QDROs). 
 91 See Yale-New Haven Hosp. II, 788 F.3d at 88; see also Trs. of the Dirs. Guild of Am. v. Tise, 
234 F.3d 415, 419 (9th Cir. 2000) (suggesting that before Congress amended ERISA with the REA, 
there was a circuit split regarding the scope and viability of state court orders from domestic relations 
proceedings as to ERISA-covered pension plans); Bonnie Moore, Federal Jurisdiction and the Do-
mestic Relations Exception: A Search for Parameters, 31 UCLA L. REV. 843, 844 (1984) (discussing 
how the domestic relations exception to ERISA’s preemption clause essentially suggests that divorce 
can be regulated by federal courts). 
 92 See Samaroo II, 193 F.3d at 193–94 (Mansmann, J., dissenting) (“The evident purpose of the 
ERISA’s recognition of QDROs is to avoid undue interference with state courts’ fulfillment of that 
charge.”). 
 93 See Ex parte Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593–94 (1890) (noting that the “whole subject of the do-
mestic relations of husband and wife . . . belongs to the laws of the states, and not to the laws of the 
United States”); see also Jonathon Dotson, Egelhoff v. Egelhoff: The Supreme Court’s Latest Attempt 
to Clarify ERISA Preemption and the Decision’s Effect on Texas State Law, 54 BAYLOR L. REV. 503, 
507 (2002) (noting two exceptions to states’ domestic relations preemption of federal law: (1) Con-
gress’s express intent to preempt and (2) significant harm to federal interests). 
 94 See Dallison, supra note 22, at 484 (discussing how Congress enacted the REA to solve inequi-
table divorce proceedings with regard to the interests that a plan participant’s former spouse accrued 
during marriage); see also supra notes 22–32 and accompanying text (discussing the primary goal of 
the REA: the financial security of divorcées). 
 95 See CARRAD, supra note 21, at 3 (noting that Congress’s purpose for amending ERISA through 
passage of the REA was to protect the financial future of the former spouses of plan participants). But 
see Hopkins v. AT&T Glob. Info. Sols. Co., 105 F.3d 153, 157 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding that a QDRO 
must be obtained when benefits vest in a beneficiary or the benefits should not be distributed to a 
former spouse). 
 96 See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(E) (2012); Ross, supra note 84, at 556 (noting that if alternate 
payees promptly submit court orders, they are less likely to lose their intended pension benefits). This 
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QDROs, regardless of when or how they are attained, some of the problems 
described by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in 1999, in Sama-
roo v. Samaroo, would become more likely.97 Additionally, uncertain liability 
would increase the potential costs of dispute resolution, which would likely 
lead to fewer retirement plans that are covered by ERISA.98 The eighteen-
month determination period already incorporated in ERISA can be used as a 
firm cutoff for plan administrators who are considering whether a posthumous 
order is a valid QDRO.99 If a plan administrator receives notice of a domestic 
relations order within the eighteen-month determination period, the order must 
be confirmed or denied as a QDRO.100 If a plan administrator receives notice 
outside of the eighteen-month determination period, however, no relief should 
be granted.101 Such a firm deadline would further ERISA’s goal to protect the 
interests of plan participants and their beneficiaries while also assuring the cost 
of operating a retirement plan covered by ERISA remains low.102 In doing so, 
the goal of a uniform regulatory scheme that promotes retirement plan cover-
age can be achieved.103 
                                                                                                                           
provision provides an eighteen-month determination period during which the plan administrator de-
termines whether a domestic relations order meets the requirements of a QDRO. See id. 
 97 See Samaroo II, 193 F.3d at 191. The Samaroo II court illustrated the dangers inherent in post-
humous QDROs by referencing a 1996 case from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Michigan, Payne v. GM/AUW Pension Plan. See id. (citing Payne v. GM/UAW Pension Plan, No. 95-
CV-73554DT, 1996 WL 943424 (E.D. Mich. May 7, 1996)). In Payne, the former spouse of a plan 
participant obtained an amended divorce decree that granted her proceeds from her former husband’s 
annuity despite his objections during their divorce proceedings while he was alive. See Payne, 1996 
WL 943424, at *3. The court classified the former spouse’s order as a QDRO even though it was 
submitted after her former husband’s remarriage and death. See id. at *4. This was largely because her 
former husband and his new wife were not married long enough for his new wife to have a viable 
interest in the survivor’s benefits. See id. at *7. 
 98 See WOOTEN, supra note 13, at 13 (noting that state legislators began to support passage of 
ERISA after state laws governing pensions proved expensive). 
 99 See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(3)(H)(i)–(v) (describing the procedures a plan administrator must 
follow during the eighteen-month determination period). 
 100 See id.; see also Terrence Cain, A Primer on the History and Proper Drafting of Qualified 
Domestic-Relations Orders, 28 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 417, 457 (2011) (noting that the purpose of the 
eighteen-month determination period is to allow courts to remedy domestic relations orders so that 
they can be classified as QDROs). 
 101 See Torres v. Torres, 60 P.3d 798, 819 (Haw. 2002) (noting that the bright-line rule of the 
eighteen-month QDRO determination period provides plan administrators with certainty regarding 
how to administer benefits). 
 102 See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (noting that ERISA was passed to protect 
workers and to encourage employers to form pension plans through uniformity and certainty); Joanne 
Sammer, An Uncertain Future for Defined-Benefit Plans, BUSINESSFINANCE (Dec. 1, 2005), http://
businessfinancemag.com/hr/uncertain-future-defined-benefit-plans [https://perma.cc/M6GD-TM6Y] 
(noting that uncertainty in plan contributions and increased cost of operating pension plans have led 
companies to stop offering pension plans). 
 103 See 29 U.S.C § 1056(d)(3)(E) (2012); see also Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 
133, 142 (1990) (noting that through ERISA, Congress sought to minimize companies’ administrative 
costs in complying with the competing requirements of state and federal laws). 
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CONCLUSION 
The Second and Tenth Circuits have correctly ruled that posthumous do-
mestic relations orders that adhere to ERISA’s QDRO requirements can legiti-
mately divide pension benefits between divorced spouses. Allowing for post-
humous QDROs closely aligns with the express purposes of ERISA and de-
creases the likelihood of a grossly inequitable and unreasonable outcome for a 
former spouse. Although correctly applying the law, the Second Circuit’s deci-
sion in Yale-New Haven Hospital v. Nicholls failed to address potential abuses 
of allowing for posthumous QDROs. To prevent abuses of QDROs, ERISA 
should be further amended to include a firm timeline during which a court may 
consider posthumous QDROs for relief for a former spouse. 
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